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Abstract
This essay provides a novel account of iterated epistemic states. The
essay argues that states of epistemic determinacy might be secured by
countenancing self-knowledge on the model of fixed points in monadic
second-order modal logic, i.e. the modal µ-calculus. Despite the epis-
temic indeterminacy witnessed by the invalidation of modal axiom 4 in
the sorites paradox – i.e. the KK principle: φ → φ – an epistemic
interpretatation of the Kripke functors of a µ-automaton permits the iter-
ations of the transition functions to entrain a principled means by which
to account for necessary conditions on self-knowledge.
This essay provides a novel account of self-knowledge, which avoids the epis-
temic indeterminacy witnessed by the invalidation of modal axiom 4 in epistemic
logic; i.e. the KK principle: φ → φ. The essay argues, by contrast, that –
despite the invalidation of modal axiom 4 on its epistemic interpretation – states
of epistemic determinacy might yet be secured by countenancing self-knowledge
on the model of fixed points in monadic second-order modal logic, i.e. the modal
µ-calculus.
Counterinstances to modal axiom 4 – which records the property of transitiv-
ity in labeled transition systems, i.e., the relational semantics for modal logic1 –
have been argued to occur within various interpretations of the sorites paradox.
Suppose, e.g., that a subject is presented with a bounded continuum, the incip-
ient point of which bears a red color hue and the terminal point of which bears
an orange color hue. Suppose, then, that the cut-off points between the points
1Cf. Kripke (1963).
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ranging from red to orange are indiscriminable, such that the initial point, a,
is determinately red, and matches the next apparent point, b; b matches the
next apparent point, c; and thus – by transitivity – a matches c. Similarly, if b
matches c, and c matches d, then b matches d. The sorites paradox consists in
that iterations of transitivity would entail that the initial and terminal points
in the bounded continuum are phenomenally indistinguishable. However, if one
takes transitivity to be the culprit in the sorites, then eschewing the principle
would entail a rejection of the corresponding modal axiom (4), which records
the iterative nature of the relation. Given the epistemic interpretation of the
axiom – namely, that knowledge that a point has a color hue entails knowing
that one knows that the point has that color hue – a resolution of the paradox
which proceeds by invalidating axiom 4 subsequently entrains the result that
one can know that one of the points has a color hue, and yet not know that
they know that the point has that color hue (Williamson, 1990: 107-108; 1994:
223-244; 2001: chs. 4-5). The non-transitivity of phenomenal indistinguisha-
bility can then provide a structural barrier to higher-order knowledge of one’s
first-order states. The foregoing result holds, furthermore, in the probabilistic
setting, such that the evidential probability that a proposition has a particular
value may be certain – i.e., be equal to 1 – while the iteration of the evidential
probability operator – recording the evidence with regard to that evidence – is
yet equal to 0. Thus, one may be certain on the basis of one’s evidence that a
proposition has a particular value, while the higher-order evidence with regard
to one’s evidence adduces entirely against that valuation (Williamson, 2014).
The argument eschews ’safety’ as a necessary condition on knowledge, for
which Williamson’s (2001) approach explicitly argues and as codified by margin-
for-error principles of the form: ∀x∀φ[Km+1φ(x) → Kmφ(x+1)]’ (Williamson,
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2001: 128; Gómez-Torrente, 2002: 114); i.e., that if one knows – relative to a
margin which ranges over a world accessible from the actual world, m – that an
object satisfies a property, then a distinct similar object satisfies that property
in the actual world. Intuitively, the safety condition ensures that if one knows
that a predicate is satisfied, then one knows that the predicate is satisfied in rel-
evantly similar worlds. Williamson targets the inconsistency of margin-for-error
principles, the luminosity principle [’∀x∀φ[φ(x) → Kφ(x)’], and the character-
ization of the sorites as occurring when an object satisfies a property, such
that similar objects would further do so. The triad evinces, arguably, that the
safety condition is not satisfied in the sorites, s.t. knowledge does not obtain,
and the luminosity principle is false. In cases, further, in which conditions on
knowledge are satisfied, epistemic indeterminacy is supposed to issue from the
non-transitivity of the accessibility relation on worlds (1994: 242).
One of the primary virtues of the present proposal is thus that it targets the
property of transitivity directly, because transitivity both engenders the sorites
paradox on the assumption that the states are known and the property is cod-
ified by the epistemic modal axiom for transitivity, i.e., 4 or the KK principle.
By so doing, it permits a uniform interpretation of transitivity in the sorites – as
codified by the KK principle – such that it applies not only to epistemic acces-
sibility relations whose obtaining is relevant to the safety condition, but further
to the logical property and its explanatory role in engendering the paradox.
A second virtue adducing in favor of the foregoing, ’epistemicist’ approach
to vagueness – which takes the latter to be a phenomenon of epistemic inde-
terminacy – is that vagueness can be explained without having to revise the
underlying logic. The epistemicist approach is consistent with classical logical
laws, such as e.g. the law of excluded middle; and thus it can determinately be
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the case that a point has a color hue; determinately be the case that the next
subsequent point has a distinguishable color hue; and one can in principle know
where in the continuum the cut-off between the two points lies – yet vagueness
will consist in the logical limits – i.e. the non-transitivity – of one’s state of
knowledge. Thus, one will not in principle be able to know that they know the
point at which the color hues are dissimilar.
In this essay, I endeavor to provide a novel account which permits the reten-
tion of both classical logic as well as a modal approach to the phenomenon of
vagueness, while salvaging the ability of subjects to satisfy necessary conditions
on self-knowledge. I will argue that – despite the invalidity of modal axiom 4,
given the non-transitivity of the similarity relation – a distinct means of secur-
ing an iterated state of knowledge concerning one’s first-order knowledge that a
particular state obtains is by availing of fixed point, non-deterministic automata
in the setting of coalgebraic modal logic. Propositional modal logic is equiva-
lent to the bisimulation-invariant fragment of fixed point monadic second-order
logic.2 The fixed point higher-order modal logic is referred to as the modal
µ-calculus, where µ(x) is an operator recording a least fixed point. Despite the
non-transitivity of sorites phenomena – such that, on its epistemic interpreta-
tion, the subsequent invalidation of modal axiom 4 entails structural, higher-
order epistemic indeterminacy – the modal µ-calculus provides a natural setting
in which a least fixed point can be defined with regard to the states instanti-
ated by non-deterministic modal automata. In virtue of recording iterations of
particular states, the least fixed points witnessed by non-deterministic modal
automata provide, then, an escape route from the conclusion that the invali-
dation of the KK principle provides an exhaustive and insuperable obstruction
2Cf. Janin and Walukiewicz (1996).
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to self-knowledge. Rather, the least fixed points countenanced in the modal
µ-calculus provide another conduit into subjects’ knowledge to the effect that
they know that a state has a determinate value. Thus, because of the fixed
points definable in the modal µ-calculus, the non-transitivity of the similarity
relation is yet consistent with necessary conditions on epistemic determinacy
and self-knowledge, and the states at issue can be luminous to the subjects who
instantiate them.
In the remainder of the essay, we introduce labeled transition systems, the
modal µ-calculus, and non-deterministic Kripke (i.e., µ-) automata. We recount
then the sorites paradox in the setting of the modal µ-calculus, and demonstrate
how the existence of fixed points enables there to be iterative phenomena which
ensure that – despite the invalidation of modal axiom 4 – iterations of mental
states can be secured, and can thereby be luminous.
A labeled transition system is a tuple comprised of a set of worlds, M;
a valuation, V, from M to its powerset, P(M); and a family of accessibility
relations, R. So LTS = 〈M,V,R〉 (cf. Venema, 2012: 7). A Kripke coalgebra
combines V and R into a Kripke functor, σR; i.e. the set of binary morphisms
from M to P(M) (op. cit.: 7-8). Thus for an s∈M, σ(s) := [σV (s), σR(s)] (op.
cit.). Satisfaction for the system is defined inductively as follows: For a formula
φ defined at a state, s, in M,
JφKM = V(s) 3
J¬φKM = S – V(s)
J⊥KM = ∅
JTKM = M
Jφ ∨ ψKM = JφKM ∪ JψKM
3Alternatively, M,s  φ if s∈V(φ) (9).
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Jφ ∧ ψKM = JφKM ∩ JψKM
J⋄sφKM = 〈Rs〉JφKM
JsφK
M = [Rs]JφK
M , with
〈Rs〉(φ) := {s’∈S | Rs[s’] ∩ φ 6= ∅} and
[Rs](φ) := {s’∈S | Rs[s’] ⊆ φ} (9).
In propositional dynamic logic (PDL), 〈pi〉φ abbreviates that some execu-
tion of a non-deterministic computable program entrains the information state
contained in φ, where computability is here defined in accord with the Church-
Turing thesis that a function is effectively computable if and only if it is par-
tial and recursive, as co-extensive with the class of λ-definable terms and the
class of finite, discrete-state automata such as Turing machines (cf. Church,
1936; Turing, 1937). [pi]φ abbreviates that all executions of a non-deterministic
computable program entrains the information state contained in φ. Complex
operations in propositional dynamic logics may then obtain (cf. Blackburn and
van Benthem, 2007: 59-61). A Choice principle states that the union of pi1 and
pi2 may be formed, such that the logic executes either pi1 or pi2. A Composi-
tion principle states that there is an operation pi1;pi1, such that the logic first
executes pi1 and then executes pi2. An Iteration principle defines a program,
pi*, where pi* entrains the execution of pi a finite number of times. Finally, a
Test principle defines a program, pi?, where pi? can comprise the following al-
gorithms: ’(pi?;a) ∪ (¬pi?;b)’, which states that if a program pi obtains, then a
obtains, else b obtains; ’a;(¬pi?;a)*;pi?’, which states that the logic will repeat
the execution, a, a finite number of times until the program pi is tested; and
’(pi?;a)*;¬pi?’, which states that while a program pi is being executed a finite
number of times, do a (op. cit.: 59-60).
The modal µ-calculus is then defined as follows. Recall again the foregoing
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Iteration principle from PDL, 〈pi*〉φ (Venema, op. cit.: 25). In our Kripke
colagebra, we thus have M,s  〈pi*〉φ ⇐⇒ (φ ∨ ⋄s〈pi*〉φ) (op. cit.). 〈pi*〉φ is
thus said to be the fixed point for the equation, x ⇐⇒ φ ∨ ⋄x, where the value
of the formula is a function of the value of x conditional on the constancy in
value of φ (op. cit., 38). The smallest solution of the formula, x ⇐⇒ φ ∨ ⋄x,
is written µ.xφ ∨ ⋄x (25). The value of the least fixed point is, finally, defined
more specifically thus:
Jµ.xφ ∨ ⋄xK = V(φ) ∪ 〈R〉(Jµ.xφ ∨ ⋄xK) (38).
A non-deterministic automaton is a tuple A = 〈A, δ, Acc, aI〉, with A a
finite set of states, aI being the initial state of A; δ is a transition function
s.t. δ: A → P(A); and Acc ⊆ A is an acceptance condition which specifies
admissible conditions on δ (60, 66). A Muller acceptance condition is defined as
a subset of A, α ⊆ P(A), such that Accα := {s∈Aω | Inf(s) ∈ α)} (intuitively:
the admissible states are the infinite states in a deployment of the transition
function) (60). A Büchi condition is a subset β ⊆ A, such that Accβ := {s∈Aω
| Inf(s) ∩ β 6= ∅} (intuitively: an operation of the transition function passes
through the state s infinitely often) (op. cit.). Finally, a parity condition is
defined via a mapping, Ω: A → ω, such that AccΩ := {s∈Aω | max{Ω(s) |
s ∈ Inf(s)} is an even number} (intuitively: Ω is the largest natural number
occurring infinitely often in the sequence of states figuring as input to δ, and
such that the automaton accepts a particular infinite state iff Ω is even (op.
cit.).
Let two Kripke models A = 〈A, a〉 and S = 〈S, s〉, be bisimilar if and only
if there is is a non-empty binary relation, Z ⊆ A x S, which is satisfied, if:
(i) For all a∈Aand s∈S, if aZs, then a and s satisfy the same proposition letters;
(ii) The forth condition. If aZs and R△a,v1 . . . vn, then there are v1 . . . v’n in
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S, s.t.
• for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) viZv’i, and
• R’△s,v’1 . . . v’n;
(iii) The back condition. If aZs and R’△s,v’1 . . . v’n, then there are v1 . . . vn
in A, s.t.
• for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) viZv’i and
• R△a,v1 . . . vn (cf. Blackburn et al, 2001: 64-65).
Bisimulations may be redefined as relation liftings. We let, e.g., a Kripke
functor, K, be such that there is a relation K! ⊆ K(A) x K(A’) (17). Let Z be
a binary relation s.t. Z ⊆ A x A’ and P!Z ⊆ P(A) x P(A’), with
P!Z := {(X,X’) | ∀x∈X∃x’∈X’ with (x,x’)∈Z ∧ ∀x’∈X’∃x∈X with (x,x’)∈Z}
(op. cit.). Then, we can define the relation lifting, K!, as follows:
K! := {[(pi,X), (pi’,X’)] | pi = pi’ and (X,X’)∈P!Z} (op. cit.).
Finally, given the Kripke functor, K, K can be defined as the µ-automaton,
i.e., the tuple A = 〈A, δ, Ω, aI〉, with aI∈A defined again as the initial state
in the set of states A; Ω defined once more as the foregoing parity acceptance
condition; and δ defined as a mapping such that δ : A → P∃(KA), where the ∃
subscript indicates that (a,s)∈A x S → {(a’,s) ∈ K(A) x S | a’ ∈ δ(a)} = Ω(a),
and (a’,s) ∈ K(A) x S if and only if {Z ⊆ A x S | [a’, σ(s)] ∈ K!(Z)} = 0 (93).
The philosophical significance of the foregoing can now be witnessed by
defining the µ-automata on an alphabet; in particular, a non-transitive set
comprising a bounded real-valued, ordered sequence of chromatic properties.
Whereas Ω, in the above parity mapping, is identified with the largest even
number occurring infinitely often in the alphabet over which the automaton
is defined, the Muller acceptance condition would appear to be more suitable
for a background language of real-valued, chromatic properties. The Kripke
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functor whose acceptance conditions are Muller permits us, subsequently, to
define fixed points relative to arbitrary points comprising the non-transitive se-
quence. Thus, although the non-transitivity of the ordered sequence of color
hues belies modal axiom 4, such that one can know that a particular point in
the sequence has a particular value although not know that one knows that the
point satisfies that value, the perceived constancy of the chromatic values, φ, in
the non-transitive set of colors nevertheless permits every sequential input state
in the µ-automaton to define a fixed point. With δMx(x’) := 〈δ〉S[x 7→x
′], the
transition function can then satisfy the Muller condition relative to each point
in the continuum, such that δMx(x’) iff V(φ ∪ 〈R〉(x’) iff V(φ) ∪ 〈R〉(Jµ.xφ ∨
⋄xK) (38).
The epistemicist approach to vagueness relies, as noted, on the epistemic
interpretation of the modal operator, such that the invalidation of transitivity
and modal axiom 4 (φ → φ) can be interpreted as providing a barrier to
a necessary condition on self-knowledge. Crucially, µ-automata can receive a
similar epistemic interpretation. Thus, interpreting the µ-automaton’s Kripke
functors epistemically permits the iterations of the set of functions – as defined
by the fixed points relative to the arbitrary points in the ordered continuum – to
provide a principled means – distinct from the satisfaction of the KK principle
– by which to account for the pertinent iterations of epistemic states unique to
an agent’s self-knowledge.
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